Cybersecurity researchers have found a focused operation in opposition to Ukraine that has been discovered leveraging an almost seven-year-old flaw in Microsoft Workplace to ship Cobalt Strike on compromised programs.
The assault chain, which befell on the finish of 2023 in keeping with Deep Intuition, employs a PowerPoint slideshow file (“signal-2023-12-20-160512.ppsx”) as the place to begin, with the filename implying that it might have been shared through the Sign prompt messaging app.
That having mentioned, there isn’t any precise proof to point that the PPSX file was distributed on this method, despite the fact that the Laptop Emergency Response Group of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has uncovered two completely different campaigns which have used the messaging app as a malware supply vector previously.
Simply final week, the company disclosed that Ukrainian armed forces are being more and more focused by the UAC-0184 group through messaging and relationship platforms to serve malware like HijackLoader (aka GHOSTPULSE and SHADOWLADDER), XWorm, and Remcos RAT, in addition to open-source packages similar to sigtop and tusc to exfiltrate knowledge from computer systems.
“The PPSX (PowerPoint slideshow) file seems to be an previous instruction handbook of the U.S. Military for mine clearing blades (MCB) for tanks,” safety researcher Ivan Kosarev mentioned. “The PPSX file features a distant relationship to an exterior OLE object.”
This entails the exploitation of CVE-2017-8570 (CVSS rating: 7.8), a now-patched distant code execution bug in Workplace that would enable an attacker to carry out arbitrary actions upon convincing a sufferer to open a specifically crafted file, to load a distant script hosted on weavesilk[.]house.
The closely obfuscated script subsequently launches an HTML file containing JavaScript code, which, in flip, units up persistence on the host through Home windows Registry and drops a next-stage payload that impersonates the Cisco AnyConnect VPN shopper.
The payload features a dynamic-link library (DLL) that finally injects a cracked Cobalt Strike Beacon, a reliable pen-testing device, immediately into system reminiscence and awaits for additional directions from a command-and-control (C2) server (“petapixel[.]enjoyable”).
The DLL additionally packs in options to examine if it is being executed in a digital machine and evade detection by safety software program.
Deep Intuition mentioned it may neither hyperlink the assaults to a particular risk actor or group nor exclude the opportunity of a pink teaming train. Additionally unclear is the precise finish purpose of the intrusion.
“The lure contained military-related content material, suggesting it was focusing on navy personnel,” Kosarev mentioned.
“However the domains weavesilk[.]house and petapixel[.]enjoyable are disguised as an obscure generative artwork web site (weavesilk[.]com) and a preferred pictures web site (petapixel[.]com). These are unrelated, and it is a bit puzzling why an attacker would use these particularly to idiot navy personnel.”
The disclosure comes as CERT-UA revealed that about 20 power, water, and heating suppliers in Ukraine have been focused by a Russian state-sponsored group referred to as UAC-0133, a sub-cluster inside Sandworm (aka APT44, FROZENBARENTS, Seashell Blizzard, UAC-0002, and Voodoo Bear), which is chargeable for a bulk of all of the disruptive and damaging operations in opposition to the nation.
The assaults, which aimed to sabotage essential operations, contain using malware like Kapeka (aka ICYWELL, KnuckleTouch, QUEUESEED, and wrongsens) and its Linux variant BIASBOAT, in addition to GOSSIPFLOW and LOADGRIP.
Whereas GOSSIPFLOW is a Golang-based SOCKS5 proxy, LOADGRIP is an ELF binary written in C that is used to load BIASBOAT on compromised Linux hosts.
Sandworm is a prolific and extremely adaptive risk group linked to Unit 74455 throughout the Principal Directorate of the Common Employees of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). It is identified to be lively since at the least 2009, with the adversary additionally tied to 3 hack-and-leak hacktivist personas similar to XakNet Group, CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn, and Solntsepek.
“Sponsored by Russian navy intelligence, APT44 is a dynamic and operationally mature risk actor that’s actively engaged within the full spectrum of espionage, assault, and affect operations,” Mandiant mentioned, describing the superior persistent risk (APT) as engaged in a multi-pronged effort to assist Russia achieve a wartime benefit since January 2022.
“APT44 operations are international in scope and mirror Russia’s extensive ranging nationwide pursuits and ambitions. Patterns of exercise over time point out that APT44 is tasked with a spread of various strategic priorities and is very seemingly seen by the Kremlin as a versatile instrument of energy able to serving each enduring and rising intelligence necessities.”
